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In this investigation, I studied the container market for the Portuguese seaport sector, 
with a series of modified Hoteling models. I can compare optimal profit expressions from a 
two-seaport model and a three-seaport model. Furthermore, these models allow to understand 
how investment in holding several terminals and quality of service is fundamental to block 
competition, raise prices and obtain higher profits. Quality of service combined with a small 
number of competitors and the current market structure in Portugal are an attractive 
combination to improve Port authorities and private terminals payoffs. By doing this I can help 
explain what is happening in the Portuguese container sector, why there are so few players in 
the market and who is benefiting with this current market structure.  
 I derive optimal price, profits and demand functions for the three main container 
seaports in Portugal: Leixões, Lisbon and Sines. It was important to understand what was the 
current market structure, who were the main players and what was their relationship. 
In the conclusions chapter, I leave some suggestions for the regulators if this market 
structure is desired, or if planned to change to a more competitive market there is also 
propositions. Should the regulator believe that no more competition can be allowed for the 
sector and that consumer well-being is safekept under this market structure, then the real 




 Nesta investigação analisa-se a situação do mercado de contentores do sector portuário 
Português, com uma série de modelos de hotelling modificados, desta forma consegue-se 
comparar expressões de lucro óptimas para um número variado de concorrentes.  
Adicionalmente, estes modelos permitem analisar a forma como investimento em qualidade de 
serviço, o aumento de preços por via da obtenção de vários terminais por parte da mesma 
empresa criando restrições à concorrência do sector por via de limitar o número de lugares que 
poderiam ser ocupados por novos concorrentes, com o objectivo de obter resultados superiores, 
resultados esses, impossíveis em concorrência. Desta forma pretende-se explicar como o sector 
opera dada a estrutura corrente de mercado, a razão pela qual existe um reduzido número de 
concorrentes e quem é que beneficia destas condições. 
Nas demonstrações existe uma formulação das procuras, lucros, preços e funções de 
utilidade para os três principais portos Nacionais: Leixões, Lisboa e Sines. A análise da 
estrutura de mercado e o reconhecimento dos principais intervenientes do sector tiveram um 
papel preponderante em todas as conclusões retiradas. 
 Nas conclusões, propõe-se algumas sugestões para a regulação do sector, relativamente 
à importância de se permitir a entrada a novos concorrentes no mercado, restringindo o número 
de terminais obtidos por cada empresa. Se, por ventura, esta estrutura corrente de mercado for 
considerada a ideal pela regulação, então esta, sendo regulada, não tem condições para admitir 
mais concorrentes e os resultados até aqui obtidos pelo sector são eficientes e que o bem-estar 
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 The Portuguese seaport sector has been a theme with several controversies, on one hand 
the news showing how the sector has reached a new record of total cargo handled, thus creating 
an image of improvement of the sector, and on the other hand, there has been a variety of strikes 
of the Lisbon port workers. It seems that the sector is moving in the right direction but I would 
like to personally assess the situation under which the seaports operate. It is known that for the 
containerized cargo the global demand is growing, so it could be a reason, along with the 
countries getting out of the financial crisis, why Portugal was capable of breaking total handled 
cargo records in the first semester of 2016, or it could, among several other factors, due to an 
increase of efficiency levels that made of Portugal a better international competitor. In either 
way, one cannot ignore the strikes that have been happening in Lisbon and that are hurting the 
Portuguese economy. For this reason, I believe that Lisbon geographical location and quality 
of service are a key factor to understand what is happening in the Seaport. As for Leixões and 
Sines, these two ports are having outstanding performances and are considered the main 
locomotive for the Portuguese sector success. It is also relevant to understand why are these 
two seaports having such success and Lisbon been falling behind in the past recent years. 
Another motive that show some anxieties about the sector is the Portuguese Competition 
Authority report mentioning some major concerns when it comes to competition issues and the 
arise of market power from the private entities running public terminals. This issue was already 
mentioned before by other scholars.  
I have developed a series of modified Hotelling models for three purposes; [1] 
understand the dynamics between competitors, [2] evaluate whether the current market 
structure can hurt the Portuguese government through a decrease of availability to pay rents 
over the concession period and lastly, [3] if terminal users are paying higher prices due to the 
market structure. After answering these three questions, I can say whether the sector has been 
able to break records due to its own investment and better performance or if there is some other 
obscure reason behind it that is creating Lisbon workers to schedule successive strikes. 
Hopefully I will also be capable of better understand why is Leixões and Sines having such 
outstanding performances when the rest of the sector is falling behind.  
This thesis is organized with the following structure, firstly a brief literature review of 
relevant studies in the area, or similar studies done in other countries as well as their concerns. 
Secondly some constraints that might influence my results along with the explanation of how 
7 
 
the model was developed. These constraints reduce the explanatory power of the presented 
models, but cannot make this thesis results invalid.  
Thirdly, in the seaport sector overview, I will be presenting [1] the market structure, [2] 
the political framework, [3] the concessions contract conditions and how this turns out to be 
an advantage/disadvantage for Portugal as an international competitor. I will start by 
comparing the sector structure with an article elaborated by Tirole, J., and Ivaldi, M., 2003, for 
the European Commission where they mention what are the relevant factors of a market 
structure that create incentives to exist tacit collusion between firms.  
Fourthly, there is a brief overview of all the models developed in the appendices and 
discuss the main conclusions of each one of them. With the conclusions, I then make a 
comparison with the Portuguese current situation and how the Portuguese Competition 
Authority arguments can be mathematically sustained.  
Lastly, there are presented the main findings, as well as, suggestions to improve and 









The seaport sector has undergone a series of studies in the last decade. As nations grow 
and international trading increases, Notteboom, T., (2015) shows that the concentration of 
terminals and competition on the sector are rising so fast that we might observe a 
deconcentration in the years to come. Several techniques have been used by researchers to 
evaluate optimal pricing strategy, efficiency levels, competition and market power for this 
sector. From DEA analysis, FDI, to geographical models and game theory the literature is 
uprising. Barros, C.P., Athanasiou, M., (2004) uses DEA analysis to measure efficiency levels 
for Portugal and Greece, which states that technical efficiency has increased for the Portuguese 
case in the given period, but, total productivity was not affected by it, leaving room for 
improvement in the sector. Cullinane, K., Song, DW., Ji, P., Wang, TF., (2004) also uses DEA 
analysis to measure efficiency for the main seaports in the world, Hamburg, Antwerp, Dubai, 
New York, Singapore, Hong Kong between others. It concludes that container port efficiency 
fluctuates over time and that current programming methods are inadequate to capture long-
term efficiency and competitiveness that arise from significant investment. Wilmsmeier, G., 
Sánchez, R., (2009) study the CARICOM countries and analyse the sector situation showing 
where are the competitiveness bottlenecks of service provision, what are the main reasons of 
its existence and conclude by making suggestions of what could be the national initiatives to 
answer these problems. This study is based on Wilmsmeier, G., Hoffmann, J., (2008) previous 
research of the Caribbean seaports that shows by using an econometric regression that the 
freight rates and distance travelled are pro-cyclical, the correlation between freight rate and the 
number of direct service providers are counter-cyclical and lastly, that correlation between 
freight rate and transit time are pro-cyclical. 
Foreign Direct Investment or FDI was used by UNCTAD, (2010) to study the 
incentives of private firms auctioning for terminals in Nigeria. It advises local competition 
authorities how to supervise the public procurements where firms auction for more than one 
terminal in the same hinterland. This study gives an insight on how competition authorities and 
sector regulators can act to reduce the margin for firms to opt through illegal agreements across 
competitors to attain a higher level of market power and thus, higher profits.  
As for geographical models, one cannot start without mentioning Hotteling, A., (1929), 
this is along with Salop’s circle model, (1979) the foundation of any geographical model. 
Hotelling, A. (1929) shows that there can be a solution considering Nash equilibrium 
considering consumer preferences and companies use locations as a strategic variable. Salop, 
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(1979) is the most famous adaptation of Hotelling model where firms are located in a circle. 
For the model developed in this thesis, the closer reference and that encouraged the model 
presented is Zhou, X., (2015) where for a three seaport hoteling model the main conclusions 
are; (1) seaports that are not located in the centre have incentives to cooperate to capture a 
higher demand from a centre seaport, (2) centre seaport optimal price is always lower or equal 
to the other seaports, never higher, and (3) profits will be determined by the investment level 
in quality of service since locations are fixed. Lastly, it can be seen in Zhou’s article as well as 
in Appendix 5 that although centre seaport benefits from its location, it is also the one that 
suffers the most when the seaports not located in the centre are close by.  
There is also literature that does not use any of the three-research approach mentioned, 
but they are equally relevant and one could not move forward without mentioning them. These 
articles are fundamental to understand what are the current issues for the sector and what it is 
believed to be the reason behind them. 
IEVA, (2014) reports that there is a need of investment in the operating system of the 
terminals for the Portuguese terminals, this means the improvement of transportation in the 
terminal and the load/unload mechanical arms. It also mentions the need to expand the terminal 
size to allocate bigger vessels. When it comes to capacity constraints for the container cargo, 
in 2013 Leixões reached 93% of its capacity, IEVA report suggests to slightly increase the 
capacity level for this specific type of cargo in the seaport to face the sector rising demand.  
Portuguese Competition Authority, (2015) released a report about the sector and raises 
some concerns at a competition level and conjunctural problems, for instance, Portuguese 
seaports performance is one of the worst in Europe, concerns arising from the existence of 
market power originated by the lack of competition and the small amount of private 
intervenients in the sector. This report is also based in IEVA, (2014) suggestions as well as a 
report called 5+1 from the Portuguese government issued in 2012, that aims to reduce port 
costs, increase exportations and competitiveness with Spain. Indeed, Marques, R. & Fonseca, 
A., (2010) criticizes the Portuguese regulation and political system for allowing Mota-Engil to 
acquire group Tertir calling to attention about an elevated market concentration on a reduced 
number of firms. 
 Also, Silva, J., (2013) points out concerns about inter and intra-port competition for 
the Portuguese seaport sector, suggesting a new tariff model, creation of an independent sector 
regulator and lastly, the change of the orientation lines of the Port Authorities in which a 
terminal concession is given to a private operator. It also explains how seaport terminals are a 
gateway linking two pieces of land, this ideology is also referred in Notteboom, T., (2010) 
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when it is explained how multi-port gateways are being formed along the coastline of some 
countries, including Portugal. This is one of the reasons why the sector competition should be 
rising eventually leading to a deconcentration as stated before, but since operators may exhibit 
market-power, by controlling more than one terminal this is a strategy that can used by already 
installed operators to block the entrance of new competitors. 
For the relevance of intra-port competition, Langen, P. & Pallis, A., (2005) conclude 
that exist social welfare benefits in the existence of intra-port competition, this is confirmed by 
the AMT to be inexistent for the Portuguese seaport sector. As for the management adopted in 
Portugal for the seaports, the landlord model, it is shown by Reeven, P., (2010) in a two-seaport 
model that Nash equilibrium can be achieved when the landlord model is used. It shows that 
have the best outcomes with or without intra-port competition when compared with other 
management models, however, this organisational form is not sustainable without regulation 
because every individual port can obtain a higher profit by separating service provision from 
port authority. Another conclusion about this article is that when intra-port competition is 
introduced, the industry profits and prices go down which may create in Port authorities and 
terminal owners the unwillingness to be opened to such competition.  
Lastly, relevant literature about transportation costs, Notteboom, T., (2010), explains 
that although barriers were abolished in the European continent, this means that cargo can 
travel free of extra expenses between the European members, there is an inefficiency related 
to the land transportation when compared with water transportation. This states that water 
transportation is cheaper than land transportation, resulting in the formation of seaport 
hinterlands that in part cannot be improved by the sector levels of efficiency of the sector 
operators. This is the main reason why Portugal can transport cargo that has a final destination 
of its own jurisdiction territory or to the closest neighbour, Spain. As for the technology 
advancements of the sector, Marques, R. & Fonseca, A., (2010) mention that the rising demand 
of the sector, the need to transport bigger volumes and the rise of competition, led to an increase 
of efficiency in terms of how cargo is loaded/unloaded, an increase of the size of the container 
vessels and an increase of the bargaining power of each ship. These factors combined are 
demanding of the terminal operators an intensive capital investment over the last decade to be 
able to keep up with the market changes and to ensure that the terminal stays attractive to the 
newest generation of container vessels. As we see an increase of the bargaining power on the 





Methodology and limitations/constraints 
 I develop a series of modified geographical Hotelling models. From the literature 
explored and practical studies for other countries, along with national reports that have been 
gone over the sector framework, there was missing a mathematical proof to sustain the findings 
and some of the arguments made by national institutions. From the appendices, which are a 
mere attempt to represent the reality, one can take out some important conclusions. How 
variable costs, the number of competitors, the quality of service differences across competitors, 
locations and transportations costs interaction, affect prices, demands, profits1 and incentives 
to collusion.   
 In the last chapter of this thesis there is a model with the Portuguese real locations that 
try to reflect the real prices and demands, where it is projected Lisbon to have higher costs than 
Leixões and Sines due to inefficiency forcing it to charge price equal to marginal cost and 
Leixões to act as a monopoly since terminals are in the possession of the same firm. 
Unfortunately, prices and demands extracted from the model are not in accordance with the 
real numbers shown, but it was the closest model from reality and some important conclusions 
can be taken out.  
 The major limitation for this analysis is the inexistence of a pure variable in any of the 
demonstrations that aims to grasp the effect of the political framework, therefore, all the 
conclusions about policy and government welfare will be taken in the following procedure; “If 
the private owners in the given structure are capable of achieving higher profits than in any 
other structure, say perfect competition, then the rent demanded by the Port Authorities will 
also be higher, making the government better off since Port Authorities are 100% state 
owned.”  
Lastly, I miss a variable that reflects how demand behaves under situational capacity 
limits and how this may force temporarily vessels to load/unload in suboptimal terminals. All 




                                                          




Seaport sector overview 
Portugal is in a crossroads of maritime fluxes of ships making it an exceptional player 
to attract vessels to load/unload that have as destination a variety of countries in the world. As 
mentioned in Notteboom, T., 2015, Portugal works as a multi-port gateway for the European 
continent even though this small country in the European tail is capable of loading and 
unloading vessels that have as destination Portugal, Spain or cargo that temporary stays for 
transhipment purposes2. This is because of the land transportation inefficiency and not due to 
inefficiency related with the Portuguese terminals capability of handling cargo, as mentioned 
in Notteboom, T. 2010 sea transportation is cheaper than land transportation. If we could 
consider that there were no transportation costs and the time value that one container would 
take to move from departure point to destination point to be insignificant, then all seaports that 
were connected by land would compete for the same vessels. Since this is not the case, 
transportation costs and the destination point of each cargo play a role in creating each seaport 
hinterland, where each seaport market power may arise depending on other seaports locations, 
capacity constraints and quality of service. 
Along the coastline, Portugal have five container seaports, and eleven terminals. Sines, 
Leixões and Lisbon represent 82% of the total handled cargo in Portugal; 42%, 24% and 16% 
respectively in 2012.  Since these seaports represent over 80% of the total cargo handled, I will 
be focusing my analysis only in these three. As for the container cargo that is what I am 
interested in, these are also the ones to represent over 90% of the market with a total of seven 
terminals, three in Lisbon and two in Sines and Leixões. Over a four-year period, from 2010 
to 2013, Sines has seen an increase of 12,8% in total handled cargo volume, Leixões 6,2% and 
Lisbon 0,9%. It seems that Sines and Leixões are being successful and in the first semester of 
2016, the sector has reached a new record of cargo handled, mainly because of Sines and 
Leixões performances, but also due to a sectorial rising demand, firms starting to export more 
leaving the economic crisis behind and because of the main international competitor’s such as 
Algeciras in the south of Spain being at capacity limit. The image below shows the 
geographical locations for the international competitors of Portugal as well as the national 
locations of the main seaports. From the top to the bottom in figure 1 it can be found Vigo, 
Leixões, Lisbon, Sines and lastly, Algeciras. Locations are a relevant factor in the decision-
                                                          
2 Sines is the most famous and successful Portuguese seaport for transhipment purposes due to its capability of 
loading/unloading the last generation of container vessels.  
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making process in where to load/unload the cargo of a vessel because of the already mentioned 
land transport inefficiency. For more on this see appendix 1.  
(Figure 1: Portugal main seaports and international competitors) 
 
(Source: Wordpress.com edited by Francisco Castelo) 
As it exists seven terminals, with seven different concessions owners operating and 
always at least two terminals that handle containers in each of the seaports in a small country 
like Portugal, one can think that competition might be fierce in the container market and that 
firms would lively compete for each vessel.  
My findings show otherwise, firstly (1) during my meeting in AMT3 I had the 
opportunity to learn that intra-port competition in Portugal is inexistent because of the 
asymmetries4 between terminals, instead, terminal concession owners try to have an efficient 
distribution between terminals for vessels planning to load/unload. Secondly (2), the sector 
presents itself under a market structure that combined with specific sectorial features are 
restrictively reducing competition.  
From (1), terminals capable of handling smaller vessels, or in other words outdated 
terminals, will accommodate smaller vessels and terminals that have been upgraded and can 
                                                          
3 AMT is an independent organism with administrative, management and financial autonomy responsible to 
regulate all the transportation sector and safekeeping the public and economic agents interest. 
4 This is a sector that is heavily dependent of investment and terminals stay out-dated fast, they will not be able 
to operate under the fast innovation of container vessels that require more mechanical arms for load/unload as 
well as longer and deeper terminals. 
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load/unload bigger vessels will operate without intra-port competition. Even though, a certain 
level of market power may arise from the terminal concession owner’s side that have an 
improved terminal, it also might not be an issue if the neighbourhood seaports have a quality 
of service higher or close to equal and are acknowledged as substitutes.  An argument that is 
commonly used in the European port framework is related with the fact that seaports in Europe 
are located closer to each other when compared with other regions in the world. By being 
closer, it means competition is more aggressive and so, it is not needed to have intra-port 
competition because inter-port competition can generate the same economic outcome benefit 
for consumers since seaports are closer. This argument could be flawless if not considered that 
port authorities impose monopoly rents which is a likely assumption for seaports that have only 
one terminal for each type of cargo creating a local monopoly for each cargo section. By 
demanding monopolistic rents the Port Authorities can also obtain profits that otherwise would 
not be possible in any other market structure where firms would lively compete since firms 
could not pay such a high rent and still be operating, because firm payoffs would not be as high 
as in a monopoly structured market.  
For (2), I will describe the market features and use Tirole, J., Ivaldi, M., 2003 paper as 
reference to understand whether we are likely to be in the presence of tacit collusion5.  
To understand which sector players will be relevant for my analysis I created the 
following diagram highlighting the sector players that onwards I will be addressing as well as 
the ones I consider to have the biggest impact on the sector performance. 
Diagram 1: Seaport sector players 
 
(Source: IEVA report 2014 edited by Francisco Castelo) 
                                                          
5 I am considering tacit collusion since explicit collusion is banned by antitrust laws, what matters is to check the 
market structure implemented in the sector and see whether concession owners take some leverage advantage 
over the consumers and the Port Authorities.  
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The vertical relevant relation of the sector for my analysis will be between the sector 
regulator AMT (Autoridade da Mobilidade e dos Transportes), the main seaport authorities and 
with concession owners operating in public terminals for the container cargo type.  
Starting by the number of competitors in this market, as mentioned above for the three 
seaports that represent over 90% of the container market in Portugal, there are seven terminals, 
the table below shows the names of concession owners for all the seven terminals: 
Table 1: Seaport, terminal and company 
Seaport Terminal Company 
 
Leixões 
North container Terminal Terminal de contentores de 
Leixões, S.A. 





Container Terminal of Santa 
Apolónia 
SOTAGUS, S.A. 
Multipurpose Terminal OPERLIS, S.A. 




Multipurpose Terminal PORTSINES, S.A. 
Container Terminal  PSA SINES, S.A. 
(Source: Port Authorities web domain, edited by Francisco Castelo) 
It can be seen by the number of firms operating that competition must be fierce even 
though in Leixões we have the same firm that is owned by the two national competitors for the 
two existent terminals.  From Tirole, J., Ivaldi, M., 2003, it is known that as the number of 
competitors increase, the harder it is for the firms to come together and can create an efficient 
punishing method to keep every agent in line to the collusion agreement. The following 












(1 + 𝛿 + 𝛿2 +⋯) 
The above expression represents the collusive intertemporal profits for firms with the 
same variable cost and homogeneous goods, where 𝜋𝑐 is the collusive profit, 𝑛 is the number 
of firms in the cartel and 𝛿 the discount factor. If one firms deviate from the collusive 
agreement it can get: 𝜋𝐶 + 𝛿 × 0 where 𝜋𝑐 represents the entire collusive profit6, and the other 
firms will answer in the following periods with a price war (𝑃𝑖 = 𝑐). This means that the cartel 
                                                          
6 This is only true if variable costs are constant. 
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must assure that the following expression holds: 
𝜋𝑐
𝑛
(1 + 𝛿 + 𝛿2 +⋯) ≥ 𝜋𝐶  From the left-
hand side, where it is represented the intertemporal cartel profit as the number of firms increase, 
the smaller the left-hand side becomes making it easier for firms to deviate from collusive 
agreements and initiate price wars since the one-time deviation becomes more attractive. 
Solving for 𝛿:  
𝛿 ≥ 𝛿∗(𝑛) ≡
𝑛−1
𝑛
   
When there are more firms in a cartel, the share of each one is smaller, thus, when 
deviating, the difference between their share and the acquisition of the total cartel profit for a 
single period is bigger creating more incentives to deviate from the collusive agreement. 
Moreover, this is even harder when terminals are structurally different, which is the 
case from above statement of AMT about the inexistence of intra-port competition. Before 
moving to the next market feature that facilitates tacit collusion, below I present a new table 
with more information about the installed firms. By cross referencing the terminal concession 
owners with a bigger economic group to see if they are indeed all independent, the following 
table was obtained. Table below shows the firms operating in each terminal as well as the 
economic group they belong to: 
Table 2: Seaports, terminals, company and group 
















Container Terminal of 
Santa Apolónia 
SOTAGUS, S.A. YILDIRIM 
Multipurpose 
Terminal 
OPERLIS, S.A. ETE 
Container Terminal of 
Alcantara 





PORTSINES, S.A. ETE 
Container Terminal  PSA SINES, S.A. 
PSA 
SINGAPORE 
(Source: ETE and Mota-Engil website, edited by Francisco Castelo) 
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From table 2, there is a significance change in the competition picture that table 1 was 
showing. It seems that all the firms except for PSA Sines, S.A. are connected through the same 
economic groups. From (1) I stated that market power from updated terminals could be 
controlled by the neighbourhood terminals influence since they were substitutes, but the 
neighbourhood for all the container terminals is under the same firm’s concession allowing 
terminals to exhibit market power over consumers more easily. From table 1, the decision 
making of each terminal pricing and investment was linked to the thought process of each 
individual terminal concession owner and the respective profit maximization under the 
available resources. In this given structure, each terminal pricing and investment will depend 
on how the economic group can obtain a higher payoff, independently of what could be the 
best outcome for each individual terminal. Moreover, we observe an artificial mechanism to 
attempt to reduce competition by occupying the available terminals7 in the market, this is a 
common method of tacit collusion because terminals will not be independently maximizing 
profits and the group itself will be maximizing the joint profit for all the terminals it possesses.  
So far, the market structure presents itself under a fixed number of available terminals 
for firms to allocate their resources and compete in a regulated market, but the number of 
competitors is currently being artificially reduced by already installed firms occupying more 
than one terminal, moreover, the difficulty of seaports to expand and build new terminals give 
a degree of confidence to installed firms that the probability of a new competitors to enter the 
market is very small. If a new terminal was to be built, firms would know upfront, due to the 
nature of the Port authorities being state owned and investments having to be justified which 
gives time for installed players to either capture the new terminal or accommodate to the new 
entrant.  
Another feature of this market is that it is capital intensive and certain levels of 
investment in quality of service may eliminate the possibility of having new competitors in the 
market. Not only block the entrance to new competitors but also may kick out of the market 
installed players in outdated terminals due to the fast innovation process this sector is facing 
from the demand side8. From Tirole, J., Ivaldi, M., 2003, entry barriers, capital intensive 
markets allow for tacit collusion agreements to be easier to maintain.  
                                                          
7 Seaports have a limited number of terminals that can be auctioned through public procurement processes, 
from this market feature the number of competitors is already fixed by the number of terminals which allows 
installed players to predetermine how many competitors they can possibly face and more importantly if 
collusion is possible and how it will affect payoffs if they were to collude.  
8 Container vessels have been under a variety of technology advancements that require of the terminals a 
constant update of their infrastructures to accommodate and load/unload bigger vessels.  
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As mentioned before that this market is facing a growing demand tendency, and this 
could be one of the reasons why the Portuguese sector reached new records in handled cargo 
for the first semester of 2016. Growing demand markets allow for tacit collusion agreements 
to be more easily sustained. 
The last market feature I would like to address is the frequency competitors interact. 
Having the same firms in all the seaports, increases the interaction between them and thus 
facilitating for illegal agreements to be more easily sustained. Adding to the multimarket 
contact, these two economic groups have cross-shares for some of the sector firms bringing 
individual objectives closer. I will present further on another example adding to the Leixões 
case where these two firms hold shares for the same firms. 
Now that I have identified the relevant market structure features that allow for tacit 
collusion agreements to be more easily sustained for this specific market, there is a clearer 
understanding why the sector regulator role is fundamental. Some of these features arise 
naturally from the market specific conditions under which concession owners operate, but for 
instance, the number of competitors and how frequently they interact can be controlled by the 
sector regulator.  
Table 3: Market structure allowing for tacit collusions agreements to be sustained 
 
(Source: Edited by Francisco Castelo) 
Before Yildirim entered the market, the sector had the same structure where group 
Mota-Engil through group Tertir was occupying the market along with ETE. Mota-Engil 
acquired from ETE, SADOPORT, S.A., one of the concession owners for Setúbal terminals 
and, Mota-Engil had a 25% share in another Setúbal concession named TERSADO, S.A. that 
ETE group holds. Markets where the only two competitors share some of the minor terminal 
operating firms is another way of making competitors walk towards common goals facilitating 
tacit collusion, therefore it exists at least two cases known in this sector where objectives from 
competitors walk hand-to-hand in the same road.  
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Mota-Engil sold group Tertir and their participation in the seaport sector to the Turk 
group Yildirim that bought this participation through one of the group firm called Yilport. This 
change has no structure implications since Yildirim didn’t have any terminal in Portugal or 
Spain.  
This chapter was started with the mentioning of (1) intra-port competition to be 
inexistent and that this could be mitigated by the neighbourhood seaports ability to be 
substitutes and (2) that the market structure implications likelihood to reduce this perspective 
in (1) from the demand side. Now that the market structure and the market features that allow 
for tacit collusions agreements to be sustained more easily have been identified it is known that 
quality of service and price practiced are the main decision factors9 that drive container vessels 
to choose where to load/unload their cargo.  
Port Authorities are a fundamental variable in the equation to have consumer’s interests 
protected. As the Seaport owners, the Port Authorities are the state organism under which 
public procurements are runt and the licence to operate in a terminal for a given period can be 
obtained by private firms. Until now, the most relevant factor that would make Port authorities 
concede the right to operate in a terminal, would be this firm availability to pay higher rents 
and invest in their terminal increasing Port Authorities rentability of the terminal. The fact that 
rents are the decision factor instead of the amount of cargo moved can originate operation 
problems hard to handle. In the table below there is represented the main financial ratios for 
the Port Authorities of Leixões, Sines and Lisbon respectively in the year of 2012 and 2013: 
 Table 4: Port Authority financial ratios for 2012-2013 
 
                                           (Source: IEVA 2014 report, edited by Francisco Castelo) 
 
In the conclusion chapter, more in this matter to be discussed as I believe this to be a 
decisive factor for some of the operating problems the sector has been facing.  
The last subject I would like to briefly cover in this chapter is the public procurement 
process and how installed firms have an advantage when compared with firms that are trying 
                                                          
9 Appendix 4 for full details. 
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to enter the market for the first time. There is a passive knowledge obtained by the installed 
firm allowing it to create a more attractive offer under the spectrum of possible outcomes than 
other firm trying to get their presence in this sector for the first time. Already installed firms 
have created during the long concession period, a relationship with some of the frequent 
consumers, these relations may prove to be relevant when the time comes to re-run for a 
terminal. This kind of advantage cannot be controlled by the regulator or the state running the 
public procurement. Although, there are other determinant factors that may influence the 
attractiveness of an offer and may benefit the installed firm, these may be controlled and 
eliminated if the procurement process is fair across firms.  
Starting off by the installation cost, an already installed firm if not obligated to re-install 
their working equipment can start in a more favourable situation when presenting a proposal 
to the state running the public procurement then firms that still must support this cost. 
 Secondly, an already installed firm already knows the institution running the 
procurement for several years, may even have close contacts with the procurement committee. 
These relations cannot interfere with the public procurement process and must be kept aside 
safeguarding the National interest of a more competitive and efficient sector where market 
power is diminished and consumer’s welfare is protected.    
Lastly, if already installed firms are still holding other terminals, it might prudent to 
carefully analyse their offer, since it is an offer that is not creating more competition, but 
indeed, artificially reducing the available slots for new firms to compete with the already 
installed firms. This argument will be discussed along the thesis demonstrations, because it is 
a fact that this happens in the Portuguese market structure. Also, by allowing this happen, it 
raises suspicions about the second argument being made about transparency and the safeguard 





Mathematical overview of the main Appendices conclusions 
 
In this chapter I will present the mathematical proofs of all the statements mentioned in 
the chapter before, being one of them that the profits for each terminal decreases as the number 
of competitors increase, bringing the price and cost of the service closer, and that the maximum 
number of competitors is strictly defined by the number of available terminals. Since there is 
no intra-port competition, one can say that each seaport acts as if they only had one big 
terminal, which is all the terminals for the same type of cargo organised. Below is the 
mathematical demonstration of how the seaport terminal concession owners profit decreases, 
as the number of competitors increase. I slightly changed the numeration for seaports, instead 
of using seaport 1 and 2, I used seaport 1 and 3 because I intend to add a new seaport on the 
demonstration after taking the conclusions for the two-seaport model. This change does not 
affect any outcome and if it wasn’t done, would generate some confusion when taking the 
conclusions for the three-seaport model.  
In a standard two competitor Hotelling model with symmetric costs, the optimal profit 
expressions10 are given by: 
𝜋1
∗ =





∗ represents the optimal profit expression for the seaport 1. 
𝑎1 represents the seaport 1 location. 
𝑎3 represents the seaport 3 location. 
t represents the unitary transportation cost. 
𝜋3
∗ =





∗ represents the optimal profit expression for the seaport 3. 
These expressions come from finding the indifferent consumer and extracting the true 
demand function for each seaport. This optimal profit expression is only valid if the indifferent 
consumer is somewhere between the two seaports meaning, that when the indifferent consumer 
is no longer in between, further steps need to be taken to find the real demand, prices and 
profits, this particular case will be shown further on.  
 
 
                                                          















































2 − 𝑎1 − 𝑎3
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And the respective prices: 
𝑃1
∗ = 𝑐 +




∗ = 𝑐 +
4 − 𝑎1 − 𝑎3
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And the respective prices: 
𝑃1









Looking at the optimal prices, seaport 3 can charge a higher price and still capture a 
higher demand than seaport 1. This is a result of a better position in the [0; 1] line than seaport 
1, this way it can be seen how locations can be used as a strategic variable when building a 
new seaport, or how the already built terminals/seaports have an advantage just by being in a 
                                                          









more favourable location. Now moving on to a three-seaport model, I will introduce a third 
seaport/terminal in between the seaport at 𝑎1 and 𝑎3 to show how the model dynamics change. 






(2 + 5𝑎1 + 6𝑎2 + 𝑎3)





(4 + 2𝑎3 − 2𝑎1)






(14 − 𝑎1 − 6𝑎2 − 5𝑎3)
2 for the seaport located in 𝑎3. 
The optimal profit expression for the already installed seaports in the two-seaport 
model, have changed because of the introduction of a new competitor, the other assumptions 
are constant. Graphically: 
 
𝜋𝑖
∗ represents the optimal profit expression for seaport i; 
𝑋(1,2) represents the indifferent consumer between seaport 1 and 2; 
𝑋(2,3) represents the indifferent consumer between seaport 2 and 3; 
 By keeping the same assumptions from the first model where;  𝑡 = 1, 𝑎1 = 0.2 and 
𝑎3 = 0.75 and adding a location to at the new seaport 2 𝑎2 = 0.5 the new profits for the already 



















Under competition, one can conclude that when going from a two-seaport model to a 
three-seaport model, individual profits greatly reduce. AMT mentioned during my personal 
interview that intra-port competition is inexistent in Portugal, this may not be an issue if the 
competition of nearby seaports/terminals of the same type of cargo is significant, especially in 
the European region where seaports are located closer than in other regions in the world. The 
Portuguese problem under this market structure is related with the fact that intra-port 
competition does not exist and the major seaports/terminals that should be perceived as 
competitors, are run by the same firms in all seaports except for Sines. If terminals are hold by 
the same firms in every seaport, then how are they really competing? There is the possibility 
of information share between terminals in different seaports. There is the possibility of vessel 
rejection in a given seaport, forcing it to load/unload in a more efficient terminal from a close 
by seaport of the same firm, increasing profits at a zero-risk cost. The optimal demand and 
price expressions with symmetric costs12 are as follows: 
𝑃1
∗ = 𝑐 +
𝑡
12
(2 + 5𝑎1 + 6𝑎2 + 𝑎3)
𝑃2
∗ = 𝑐 +
𝑡
12
(4 + 2𝑎3 − 2𝑎1)
𝑃3
∗ = 𝑐 +
𝑡
12
(14 − 6𝑎2 − 5𝑎3 − 𝑎1)
 










(8 + 4𝑎3 − 4𝑎1) 
D3
∗ =





(14 − 5𝑎3 − 6𝑎2 − 𝑎1) 
With 𝑡 = 1, 𝑎1 = 0.2, 𝑎2 = 0.5 and 𝑎3 = 0.75 assumptions: 
The Optimal prices: 
𝑃1














                                                          
12 In Appendix 5 there is the full demonstration with asymmetric costs, for the symmetric, costs I assumed 
𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐3 = 𝑐 
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From the consumer side, the addition of a third seaport brings a positive impact in the 
consumer surplus. Not only for those near the new seaport, but also for the consumers that are 
located the furthest. For those that are located nearby, two positive impacts happen, the first, 
is the possibility of a lower travel cost to access the same service, the second is related with 
how a new seaport at a new location creates a pressure on every seaport/terminal price to go 
down under competition. The furthest consumers from this seaport benefits from this second 
positive impact, even though they do not access the service on the new seaport/terminal, the 
already installed firms are forced to lower prices and so, creating a positive impact on the 
consumer surplus. Below there is a demonstration of this: 
Consumer located at 0 buying from 𝑎1: 
𝑈0
∗(1) = 𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑎1 − 0) − 𝑃1
∗ ↔ 
↔ 𝑈0




Consumer located at 0 buying from 𝑎2: 
𝑈0
∗(2) = 𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑎2 − 0) − 𝑃2
∗ ↔ 
↔ 𝑈0




 The consumer utility at location 0 is higher from buying at 0.2 seaport then buying at 




Now, comparing the two-seaport utility for the same consumer with the three-seaport 
model. Consumer at location 0, buying at the 0.2 location in a two-seaport model; 
𝑈0









There is an increase of utility for this consumer when the market structure went from 




Another fact that we can prove in this model is that when increasing the number of 
competitors and keeping the same geographical area, which for this case the [0; 1] line, the 
impact of locations on prices and demands become smaller, this goes hand-to-hand with 
empirical evidence, meaning that location can be a decisive strategic variable in our equation 
when choosing where to open a new store, or for this case, when building a terminal/seaport, 
but as the number of competitors seen as providing a substitute service increase, the impact of 
our location becomes less relevant. 
I have shown mathematically so far that prices go down as the number of competitors 
goes up and that consumer surplus for every consumer increases when the number of 
competitors goes up.  
Now I will address how the cost limits changes with the market structure. This is 
relevant to understand why monopoly market structure is inefficient, and why does installed 
firms have incentives to create conditions, namely acquire several terminals reducing 
competition, to bring the market acting closer to a monopoly model instead of any kind of 
competition model. The price range can vary between c which is the variable cost and R, which 
is the reservation price of consumers, 𝑃 ∈ [𝑐; 𝑅]. If we consider variable costs to be zero and 
reservation price to be infinite: 𝑃 ∈ [0;+∞] bringing the price closer to c depending on what 
values it takes, will depend of the competition found, so under perfect competition, one can 
say that 𝑃 = 𝑐 and under a monopoly model 𝑃 = 𝑅 if unitary transportation costs were to be 
considered zero (𝑡 = 0). In the below demonstration, I show how cost limits for installed firms 
vary depending on the market structure they face. Since variable costs represent the minimum 
value of the price practiced by the terminal, it is important to understand what are the limits for 















 In the figure above, it is represented a monopoly situation, where firms are in the 
extremes of the line and can only satisfy up to a part of the market due to the consumers 
exhibiting a small reservation price (R), and so, some of the consumers that are further will not 
buy. This creates a scenario where terminals act as local monopolies with no competition, 𝑥1 
and 𝑥2 represents the last consumer that buys.  
























 With the following expressions, I can now find the cost limits for a model with local 
monopolies and compare them with the first model (Page 23) I presented where terminals 
would lively compete.  
 
In the monopoly case: 









 , otherwise we would not be in the presence of local monopolies. 
And for the competition case: 
𝑐 < 𝑅 − 𝑡 −
𝑡
2
(𝑎2 − 𝑎1) 
                                                          
13 Full demonstration on Appendix 2. 
𝑎1 = 0 
𝑎2 = 1 𝑥1 𝑥2 
Consumer’s that do not buy 
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 It can be seen that local monopolies allow for higher costs and so firms do not need to 
be efficient. Notice that transportation costs have a big impact in the cost limits, if they were 
to be zero, consumers would freely travel without any extra cost and both models would 
generate a 𝑐 < 𝑅 cost expression, making it impossible to observe the cost efficiency gains 
from having competition. If there is a small positive cost for travelling, which in fact should 
always be true, since transportation cost can be the sum of a variety of variables, all of them 
taking positive values, such as the vehicle standard transportation cost, the opportunity cost of 
the time spent travelling and the risk of an accident, these are plausible positive transportation 
costs and will most likely never be zero.  
Now that the c value limits are explained and since the reservation price depends of the 
consumer, when considering locations to be equal (𝑎1 = 𝑎2) and no other terminal to provide 
the service, for any given consumer, the transportation costs to move to either one of the 
terminals is the same, being the only decisive factor the price of each terminal. If prices are 
different, say 𝑃1
∗ > 𝑃2
∗, the terminal 1, which charges a higher price, will not sell the service 







This is an important conclusion when analysing intra-port competition where terminals 
compete for the same type of cargo, my objective with this case is to make a line of reasoning 
to talk about Lisbon and Setúbal terminals. These two locations are close by and are considered 
competitors, but Setúbal practices the highest price of service provided for the load/unload of 
0 
R 
𝑐 < 𝑅 − 𝑡 −
𝑡
2
(𝑎2 − 𝑎1) 𝑐 < 𝑅 − 𝑡𝑎1 − 2𝑡(𝑥1
∗ − 𝑎1) 





1   0   





𝑎1 = 𝑎2 
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containers in the whole country and still has a small portion of the total cargo handled in 
Portugal for the container market.  
The small demand can be justified by periods of time where the other seaports were 
heavily operating creating long waiting periods and so, Setúbal was the only solutions for these 
vessels, now this means that Setúbal operates under residual demands and exhibits monopoly 
prices; can this be optimal? For a firm looking to establish their own business and position 
itself as a solution for the majority of the vessels, optimizing individual terminal profits, it is 
not. However, as a terminal that belongs to the same firm that operates in the other seaports, 
this can be optimal because as I showed before, prices can go up to R (Reservation price) when 
unitary transportations costs are close to zero and there is no competition, the consumer will 
be forced to load/unload in Setúbal under these conditions. There could be an argument that 
Setúbal terminals are inefficient and so variable costs are higher, making the terminals 
operating under higher costs, thus having higher prices. The only problem with this argument 
would be that since the terminals belong to the same major groups that hold terminals operating 
in other seaports, information is perfect across terminals of the same firm, as well as the know-
how, making the high variable cost argument hardly sustainable, unless there is a high 
technology asymmetry across terminals, this can be perceived as quality of service and will be 
shown its impact in equilibrium prices, demands and profits further on this chapter.  
In my reasoning, Setúbal is the biggest evidence for the Portuguese Seaport sector that 
this market structure allows firms to exhibit market power, and if not having intra-port 
competition is not perceived as a sectorial problem, then having the same major economic 
groups holding terminals in different seaports should be a major concern when adding to the 













Below I present the prices charged and the demand of the Leixões, Lisbon, Setúbal and 
Sines seaports.  
Table 5: Prices charged by Leixões, Lisbon, Sines and Setúbal container terminals  
Seaport Concessions Std. Container Large container 
Leixões TCL 138,19€ 138,19€ 
    
Lisbon LISCONT 117,85€ 117,85€  
SOTAGUS 110,41€ 110,41€  
TSA 108,00€ 108,00€ 
    
Sines PSA SINES 122,26€ 179,11€  
PORTSINES 112€ 112€ 
    
Setúbal TERSADO 158,48€ 158,48€ 
 SADOPORT 151,96€ 151,96€ 
                                                                                            (source: Port authorities’ websites, edited by Francisco Castelo) 
 When comparing prices and locations for Lisbon and Setúbal, would be safe to argue 
that Setúbal only operates when Lisbon is not able to provide the service in the same moment 
in time. 
Table 6: Demand for the Leixões, Lisbon, Sines and Setúbal load/unload container services (in TEU) 
















Graphic 1: Demand for the Leixões, Lisbon, Sines and Setúbal load/unload container services 
 
(Source: Autoridade da Mobilidade e dos Transportes – Acompanhamentos dos mercados Portuários, Novembro 2015) 
 The demand positive evolution in Sines is explained by the entrance of PSA Singapore 
in 2004 in the Seaport, this firm invested heavily in the container terminal they own and made 
the Portuguese container market more dynamic and to be a reference for many international 
firms to load/unload. 
As for Leixões and Lisbon, we observe a swap in the ranking of cargo movement, 
Lisbon reflects a small negative tendency and at the same time, Leixões shows a positive trend 
in the total of cargo handled. This goes hand-to-hand with all the arguments made in this thesis 
about Leixões and Lisbon current situation, it was expected to observe a reduce in total cargo 
handled in Lisbon when both seaports closer to Lisbon with international influence are being 
developed, whereas Lisbon stagnated when it comes to terminal and service improvements. 
The arguments for this dormant situation in Lisbon have already been discussed and have been 
mathematical proved, as well as severely discussed in other previous articles. This should be 
perceived as a warning for the Lisbon current situation, when this is a sector of constant 
innovation from the supply side of containers, more dynamism and transparency need to 
happen in the Portuguese seaport that can mostly benefit14 from it geographical location. 
I will now present the closest model I could achieve that has results for demands and 
prices for this sector closer to the reality values. The model had to assume competition 
restrictions, to bring results closer to the real values. 
 
                                                          
14 Appendix 3 and 1, as well as page 20 shows how Lisbon benefit the most from its location, closer to the 
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Three-seaport model with non-symmetry cost for the Portuguese Sector 
 After attempting to replicate the demands and prices for the three main seaports in 
Portugal, Leixões, Lisbon and Sines the closer model from reality I achieved will be presented 
in this section. I believe that the differences between reality and the modulation made here is 
related with the fact that my model does not cover waiting periods, quality of service 
differences and assumes that seaports are competing. Since I was not able to estimate values 
for the quality of service I did not include it, but I created a two-seaport model with quality of 
service variable to present the dynamics15 of this variable. I assumed locations for the three 
seaports to be fixed, Leixões 𝑎1 = 0.1, Lisbon 𝑎2 = 0.5 and Sines 𝑎3 = 0.7, where the [0; 1] 
line represents a uniform distribution for the Portuguese inland territory. I assumed Lisbon to 
be under intense competition and practices a price equal to the variable cost (𝑃2 = 𝑐). 
 
 
Utility expressions for consumers that travel for each seaport: 
𝑈(1) = 𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑋(1,2) − 𝑎1) − 𝑃1 ;  𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑎1  
𝑈(3) = 𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑎3 − 𝑋(2,3)) − 𝑃3;  𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑎3 
𝑈(2) {
𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑎2 − 𝑋(1,2)) − 𝑃2 𝑖𝑓 𝑎2 > 𝑋𝑖 ;  𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑎2




With 𝑎1 = 0,1, 𝑎2 = 0,5 and 𝑎3 = 0,7 and 𝑡 = 1; 
𝑋(1,2) ↔ 𝑈(1) = 𝑈(2) ↔ 
↔ 𝑅 − (𝑋(1,2) − 0,1) − 𝑃1 = 𝑅 − (0.5 − 𝑋(1,2)) − 𝑃2  ↔ 










                                                          
15 The full model demonstration can be found in Appendix 4. 
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𝑋(2,3) ↔ 𝑈(2) = 𝑈(3) ↔ 







   
 
Demands: 



































Taking the first order condition: 


































Seaport 2 is under intense competition and practice a perfect competition price: (𝑃2
∗ = 𝑐2) 












































































































Consumers from 0 up to 0.15 will buy at seaport located in 𝑎1. 
Testing: 
Consumer located at 0.15 buying choice 
Cost from buying at seaport located in 0.1: 
𝑅 − 1(0.15 − 0.1) − 𝑐 − 0.3 = 




Cost from buying at seaport located at 0.5 
𝑅 − 1(0.5 − 0.15) − 𝑐 = 




Any consumer located to the left of 
3
20
 will have a lower cost from buying at seaport 
located at 0.1. Any consumer located to the right of 
3
20
 will have a lower cost from buying at 




































∗  is to the right of seaport 𝑎2, the optimal price given by the optimal price condition 
is not valid, since for the price 𝑐 +
4
10
 consumers are better of buying at the seaport located at 
0.5 and there for, demand for seaport located at 0,7 is zero.  
Consumer located in 1 
Utility from buying at 0.7: 
𝑅 − 1(1 − 0.7) − 𝑐 − 0.4 = 





Utility from buying at 0.5: 
𝑅 − 𝑐 − 1(1 − 0.5) − 𝑐 = 




Consumer at 1 will buy from seaport at 0.5. 
Consumer located at 0.7 
Utility from buying at 0.7: 








Utility from buying at 0.5: 
𝑅 − 1(0.7 − 0.5) − 𝑐 = 






There must be a price for seaport 3 that makes consumers to the right of its location 
indifferent between buying from him or the seaport located at 0.5 and since they are indifferent, 
they will buy from the closest seaport. Testing for consumer located at 0.7: 
𝑈2 = 𝑈3 
𝑅 − 1(0.7 − 0.5) − 𝑃2
∗ = 𝑅 − 1(0.7 − 0.7) − 𝑃3
∗ ↔ 
↔ 𝑃3




Consumer located at 1: 
Buying from seaport at 0.5 
 𝑅 − 1(1 − 0.5) − 𝑐  




Buying from seaport at 0.7: 
𝑅 − 1(1 − 0.7) − 𝑐 − 0.2 




For the price (𝑃3
∗ = 𝑐 +
2
10
) all consumers to the right of the seaport located at 0.7 are 
indifferent between buying from seaport two and seaport three, and will buy from seaport three 
since it is the closest.  
Identifying the demands: 
𝐷1














































































− [𝑐 ×  
3
20








































 Since Prices, demands and profits estimated are further apart from reality, I will 
introduce cost asymmetry, assuming Lisbon to have a higher variable cost than the other 






























































































If 𝑐2 = 1 and 𝑐1 = 𝑐3 = 0.5 
𝑋(1,2)
∗ =  0.275 
𝑋(2,3)


































] − [𝑐 × 
11
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When cost asymmetry exists, seaports with lower costs can obtain higher profits than 
in a scenario where seaports have symmetric costs. 
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Does seaport three have incentives to reduce price to increase profits? 









































































Sines (seaport in location 3) has no incentives to reduce prices under cost asymmetry 
of seaports. It seems that models where monopolistic competition exists brings the results 
closer to the reality values, in this case, collusion in Leixões, Lisbon operating under higher 
costs, forcing it to practice 𝑃2
∗ = 𝑐2 and Sines with monopolistic competition. Furthermore, 
Leixões has been heavily developed by the installed firms, leaving Lisbon with no technology 
improvements, this is another fact that could be different if Lisbon was operating under the 
terminals ownership of a different firm from the ones operating in Leixões. This differences in 
quality of service may also be the reason why Lisbon is operating under higher costs16, the lack 
of innovation and investment in more efficient technology. If differences in quality of service 
are introduced in the first model I’ve discussed in the chapter, it can be seen how the new 
dynamics from differences in quality of service allow firms to exhibit higher prices when there 
these are acknowledged by the consumer. This might indicate that Lisbon is being used by the 
firms to allow Leixões to be developed creating better conditions to compete with the only 
foreigner firm installed in Portugal, more accurately, in Sines, and at the same time assuring 
that no competition arises in Lisbon from a competitor to invest in Lisbon terminals, since 
these are owned by the same firms. This argument makes sense with the declining demand 
seen in the past years for the Lisbon seaport, the current successive strikes, as well as with the 
                                                          
16 I mentioned in page 26 that under the influence of the same firm in different terminals that variable costs 
should be equal across terminals form different seaports, what I didn’t mention, since no differences in quality 
of service were assumed in that model, was that investment in quality of service may also reduce variable 
costs creating non-symmetric variable costs across the sector. 
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Port Authority financial results for the Lisbon seaport being the only one presenting positive 
results close to zero and in some years even negative.  
 If quality of service is introduced17 and variable costs non-symmetry in the first two-




















𝛾(𝑠2 − 𝑠1) − 𝑐2 + 𝑐1 + 𝑡(4 − 𝑎1 − 𝑎2)
6𝑡
 
As the optimal price expression shows, the own quality of service increases the own 
price and the competitor quality of service reduces own optimal price. 
 As the optimal demand expression shows, the own quality of service increases the own 
demand and the competitor quality of service reduces own optimal demand.  
This differences in quality of service may create differences in prices, just like we 
observe but notice that these differences need to be perceived for the consumer and have an 
impact of 𝛾 per unit of quality of service differences, and 𝛾 should take values between 0 and 
1. In some cases it can be seen a huge difference in prices being practiced in Portugal for the 





2 + 𝑡2(2 + 𝑎1 + 𝑎2)
2 + 𝛾(𝑠1 − 𝑠2)𝑡(2 + 𝑎1 + 𝑎2)
18𝑡
+ 












2 + 𝑡2(4 − 𝑎1 − 𝑎2)
2 + 𝛾(𝑠2 − 𝑠1)𝑡(4 − 𝑎1 − 𝑎2)
18𝑡
+ 
                                                          
17 For the full demonstration see Appendix 4. 
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2 − 2𝑐2𝑐1 + 𝑐1𝛾(𝑠2 − 𝑠1) − 𝑐2𝛾(𝑠2 − 𝑠1)
18𝑡
 
 If 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐 and 𝑠1 = 𝑠2 = 𝑠; 
𝑃1
∗ = 






























The first model optimal price, demand and profit expressions are obtainable under the 






















I have gone through a series of market features that currently need to be reviewed by 
the AMT if the sector is to improve their performance and social welfare. Firstly, the monopoly 
rent seeking created by the artificial reduction of competitors by allowing the same economic 
group to occupy several terminals is not benefiting the consumers nor the cargo handlers. This 
occupation of several terminals lead to a slower evolution of quality of service as the neighbour 
seaports are controlled by the same firms leaving container cargo vessels with no other 
alternatives to load/unload. This scenario is aggravated by the Spanish seaports being at 
capacity limit and the constant growing demand for this sector allows for the Portuguese 
terminal handlers to be in a favourable situation. Furthermore, this scenario allows Port 
authorities, which are State owned to yearly have a net earning higher than most of the 
Portuguese private firms operating in other sectors. Quality of service is the method for 
competitors to capture more freight and distinguish themselves by the competitors, 
mathematical proof in appendix 4. Consistent investment is required in this sector if firms want 
to survive the constant technology evolution from the demand side, which can be mitigated if 
firms control all the terminals for containers in the neighbourhood, it gives a level of confidence 
that no one will invest in quality of service, creating a comfortable scenario for the firms to be 
in, with less uncertainty and firms may ultimately operate as a monopoly for residual demands, 
as seen to be the case of Setúbal. Having multiple terminals increase the multi-market contact 
between competitors allowing for coordinated effects and the sustainability of cartels to be 
more easily maintained.  The public procurement process needs to be more transparent and to 
keep in mind estimated quantities moved, as well as planned investments, instead of only 
considering the estimated rent offer from the private firm.  
The concession period needs to be reviewed as longer periods of concession allows for 
the coordinated effects and the cartel agreements to hold easier. This is an important factor 
because Portugal have long concession periods but our neighbour country Spain is operating 
under even longer concession periods, which is an unfair position for the Portuguese firms to 
be in since they have less time to operate and plan long-term investments. I believe that the 
European commission needs to act in the Spanish market since they advise countries to look 
for concessions periods of no longer than 19 to 20 years and Spain has concession periods of 
48 years. Portugal has one similar case but taking it as a new rule for the future concessions 
would be wrong even though Portugal faces an unfair competition with Spain on this matter.  
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Just like when PSA, SINES entered the market in 2004 the Portuguese market share for 
the container sector has been growing ever since, there might be incentives to allow other firms 
to enter the Portuguese market instead of having the same economic groups holding several 
terminals. The model that allowed to achieve a closer variable simulation to reality assumes 
collusion and monopolistic competition, which are models that are known to reduce the 
consumer surplus. 
One major change for the sector that could may prove to be beneficial, would be the 
fusion of Lisbon and Setúbal seaports, operating under one Administrative Authority. Aside 
from the elimination of the double administrative costs, it has been shown that intra-port 
competition, or inter-port competition can create the same results in the consumer welfare if it 
is regulated. Therefore, having two seaports so close and with the current need to finance and 
invest in quality of service for the Lisbon seaport, this fusion could attract new firms to operate, 
creating a strong dynamism at the port. Since the available terminals count does not decrease, 
there is no competition reduction and it may be even easier to control whether the firms are 
indeed independent or if they have common interests, just like in the current structure the sector 
faces. Allowing Lisbon to be developed, as Leixões to the North and Sines to the South will 
reduce the asymmetries between seaports and terminals, making competition fair and the 
possibility to provide a better service to the consumer. 
To finish, this thesis started with three questions; [1] understand the dynamics between 
competitors, [2] evaluate whether the current market structure can hurt the Portuguese 
government through a decrease of availability to pay rents over the concession period and 
lastly, [3] if terminal users are paying higher prices due to the market structure. After presenting 
the finding, in [1] it seems that competitors have common interests in several geographical 
points, hold terminals in different locations, creating multi-market contact, facilitating 
collusion in many ways. In [2] as was not expected, this structure does not hurt the Portuguese 
government, actually it benefits it by allowing Port Authorities to charge monopoly rents and 
allowing them to have net earnings ratios of 20% and in some cases close to 30%, remember 
that Port Authorities are state owned and should have as the main objective the maximization 
of welfare and not the profit maximization. Lastly in [3] the answer can’t be 100% accurate 
and it can only be answered by changing the market structure, allowing more independent firms 
to compete and then compare present prices with the future prices. Nonetheless there are some 
evidences that under the given market structure, there are favourable conditions for the private 
owners to exhibit market power and an increase of prices.  
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𝑎 1   𝑎 2   1   0   






Two seaports located at 𝑎1and 𝑎2;  
𝑅 is the reservation price and is high enough to have every point of the [0; 1] line 
covered. 
t is the unitary transportation cost; 
 is the distance between indifferent consumer and seaport n; 
Costs are equal and denoted by 𝑐. 
 












































































∗ − 𝑐). 𝐷2 
𝜋2
∗ =








𝑡(2 − 𝑎1 − 𝑎2)
2











3𝑐 + 𝑡(4 − 𝑎1 − 𝑎2)
3
[
3𝑐 + 𝑡(2 + 𝑎1 + 𝑎2)
3
−




𝑡(2 − 𝑎1 − 𝑎2)
2
] − 𝑐 [
3𝑐 + 𝑡(2 + 𝑎1 + 𝑎2)
3
−
























Appendix 2: Hotteling two-seaport model with local monopolies 
 
 






Our Utility functions are given by:  
𝑈(1) = 𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑥1 − 𝑎1) − 𝑃1; Utility for buyers under seaport 𝑎1 niche market 
𝑈(2) = 𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑎2 − 𝑥2) − 𝑃2; Utility for buyers under seaport 𝑎2 niche market 
Now that we have two monopolies operating, 𝑥1and 𝑥2 locations will depend of travelling cost 
(t) and prices 𝑃1and 𝑃2. 𝑥1and 𝑥𝑛 are the last consumer for each seaport respectively. Now we 
have that: 
𝑈(1) can be written as: 
𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑥1 − 𝑎1) − 𝑃1 = 0 ↔ 





𝑥1 is the demand for seaport located at 𝑎1. Notice that when R increases, 𝑥1moves to the right, 
meaning an increase on quantity bought, on the other side when 𝑃1increases 𝑥1moves to the 
left, we observe a decrease on quantity supplied. Lastly, 𝑥1 moves in the same direction of 𝑎1 
and decreases when unitary transportation cost (t) increases. 
And; 
𝑈(2) can be written as: 
𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑎2 − 𝑥2) − 𝑃2 = 0 ↔ 
𝑎1 𝑎2 𝑥1 𝑥2 
Consumer’s that do not buy 
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Now, 𝑥2 analysis might seem confusing since we see 𝑥2moving to the right when 𝑃2 increases, 
but notice that when 𝑥2 is moving to the right it is reducing quantity supplied by seaport located 
at 𝑎2. Same goes for the 𝑅 analysis, R is negatively impacting 𝑥2 which means, when R 
increases, 𝑥2 moves to the left, therefore increases quantity supplied. 𝑎2and 𝑡 analysis follow 
the same logic as the equivalent variables of demand for seaport located at 𝑎1, when unitary 
transportation costs increase, quantity supplied decreases and when 𝑎2moves to the right, 
𝑥2moves accordingly. Might be important to explain why does 𝑥2moves to the right when 𝑡 
increases, notice that 𝑅 is our reservation price, and we are considering that in order to have 
consumers such condition must be satisfied: 𝑅 > 𝑃2, so 
𝑃2−𝑅
𝑡
 < 0 and this is why 𝑥2is moving 
to the right when 𝑡 increases. 
We now need to find optimal pricing for each seaport: 
Seaport at 𝑎1: 



























Now that we have 𝑃1



























Seaport at 𝑎2: 








𝐷2 = 1 − 𝑥2 =
𝑅 − 𝑃2
𝑡








+ 1 − 𝑎2 −
𝑐
𝑡



























Appendix 3: Cost limits comparison between the two previous models 
 
Checking for costs (c) limits: 
For the first model (Appendix 1) we had: 
𝑃1
∗ =

















If 𝑎1 = 0 and 𝑎2 = 1 with 𝑡 = 1 
𝑃1










+ 0 − 𝑐 − 1 = 0 ↔ 




Solving with the general expression: 
𝑈(1) = 𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑥(1,2) − 𝑎1) − 𝑃1
∗ ↔ 








− 𝑎1) − 𝑃1
∗ > 0 ↔ 
↔ 𝑅 − 𝑡(
3𝑐 + 𝑡(4 − 𝑎1 − 𝑎2)
3 − [













↔ 𝑅 > 𝑡(
3𝑐 + 𝑡(4 − 𝑎1 − 𝑎2)
3 − [








3𝑐 + 𝑡(2 + 𝑎1 + 𝑎2)
3
 
↔ 𝑅 > 𝑡 (





− 𝑎1) + 𝑐 +
𝑡(2 + 𝑎1 + 𝑎2)
3
↔ 
↔ 𝑅 > 𝑡 (





) + 𝑐 +
𝑡(2 + 𝑎1 + 𝑎2)
3
↔ 
↔ 𝑅 >  𝑡 (
2𝑡(1 − 𝑎1 − 𝑎2) + 3𝑡(𝑎2 − 𝑎1)
6𝑡
) + 𝑐 +
𝑡(2 + 𝑎1 + 𝑎2)
3
↔ 
↔ 𝑅 > 𝑡 (
2𝑡 − 2𝑡𝑎1 − 2𝑡𝑎2 + 3𝑡𝑎2 − 3𝑡𝑎1
6𝑡
) + 𝑐 +
𝑡(2 + 𝑎1 + 𝑎2)
3
 ↔ 
↔ 𝑅 > 𝑡 (
2 − 5𝑎1 + 𝑎2
6
) + 𝑐 +




𝑡(2 − 5𝑎1 + 𝑎2)
6
+ 𝑐 +




𝑡(2 − 5𝑎1 + 𝑎2) + 2𝑡(2 + 𝑎1 + 𝑎2)
6
+ 𝑐 ↔ 
↔ 𝑅 >
6𝑡 − 3𝑡𝑎1 + 3𝑡𝑎2
6
+ 𝑐 ↔ 
↔ 𝑅 > 𝑡 +
𝑡(𝑎2 − 𝑎1)
2
+ 𝑐 ↔ 




Our general function when replaced by the above case where 𝑎1 = 0 and 𝑎2 = 1 with 𝑡 = 1, 
we get the same result. 
The following expressions for c means that c can increase up to that value:  







𝑐 > 𝑅 − 𝑡 −
𝑡(𝑎2−𝑎1)
2
 Demand is 0. 
Now for the second model (Appendix 2) we had: 
𝑃1
∗ =






















Replacing in our utility function: 
𝑈(1) = 𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑥1
∗ − 𝑎1) − 𝑃1
∗ ↔ 













↔ 𝑅 = 2𝑥1
∗ + 𝑐 ↔ 
↔ 𝑅 = 2 [
𝑅 − 𝑐
2
] + 𝑐 
𝑈(1) = 0 
In a monopoly consumer surplus is always 0, there is a full extraction of the consumer 
surplus. Although consumer surplus is zero, consumer’s only buy up to the point where 𝑅 =
𝑃1
∗ + 𝑡(𝑥1
∗ − 𝑎1) if 𝑅 < 𝑃1
∗ + 𝑡(𝑥1
∗ − 𝑎1) demand is zero and if 𝑅 = 𝑃1
∗ + 𝑡(𝑥1









𝑅 + 𝑐 + 𝑡𝑎1
2
+ 𝑡(𝑥1
















∗ − 𝑎1] ↔ 
↔ 𝑅 = 𝑐 + 𝑡𝑎1 + 2𝑡[𝑥1
∗ + 𝑎1] ↔ 






𝑎1] − 2𝑡𝑎1 ↔ 
↔ 𝑅 = 𝑐 +  𝑡𝑎1 − 𝑅 − 𝑐 + 𝑡𝑎1 − 2𝑡𝑎1 ↔ 
↔ 0 
So what is the c value? The cost value can increase up to this point: 
𝑅 > 𝑃1
∗ + 𝑡(𝑥1
∗ − 𝑎1) ↔ 
↔ 𝑅 >
𝑅 + 𝑐 + 𝑡𝑎1
2
+ 𝑡(𝑥1
∗ − 𝑎1) ↔ 




∗ − 𝑎1) 
The cost value 𝑐 ∈ (0, 𝑅) if transportation costs are zero (𝑡 = 0), when 𝑐 = 𝑅 our only 
consumer is the one that don’t have to move, in other words the one at the same location as 
𝑎1 (𝑎1 = 𝑥1). 







In a Monopoly model the range for cost inefficiency increases.  
0 
R 
𝑅 − 𝑡 −
𝑡
2
(𝑎2 − 𝑎1) 𝑅 − 𝑡𝑎1 − 2𝑡(𝑥1
∗ − 𝑎1) 
Duopoly model Monopoly model 
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Appendix 4: Two-seaport model with non-symmetric variable costs and quality of 
service 
 
2 seaports Model with non-symmetric quality of service and positive and different 
variable costs.  
The same model as in appendix 1 adding the following: 
s is representing the quality of service of seaports and it goes into the utility function 
as a variable that is increasing the utility, 𝛾 is a coefficient of the quality of service, it 
is linked with consumer’s perspective and value for the quality of the given seaport.  
I am assuming that 𝛾 > 0 and 𝛾𝑠 > 0   
  
General expression of the indifferent consumer for this model: 
𝑈𝑋(𝑛−1,𝑛) ↔ 𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑋(𝑛−1,𝑛) − 𝑎𝑛−1) − 𝑃𝑛−1 + 𝛾𝑠𝑛−1 = 𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑎𝑛 − 𝑋(𝑛−1,𝑛)) − 𝑃𝑛 + 𝛾𝑠𝑛  
 
Indifferent consumer between seaport 1 and 2 expression:  
𝑈𝑋(1,2)(1) = 𝑈𝑋(1,2)(2) 
𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑋(1,2) − 𝑎1) − 𝑃1 + 𝛾𝑠1 = 𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑎2 − 𝑋(1,2)) − 𝑃2 + 𝛾𝑠2 
𝑋(1,2) =






















































Profit for each seaport:  
  




Where   
  




If we assume that 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐 and 𝑠1 = 𝑠2 = 𝑠 in this model, similarly to appendix one, the 













Utility expressions for consumers that travel for each seaport: 
𝑈(1) = 𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑋(1,2) − 𝑎1) − 𝑃1 ;  𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑎1  
𝑈(3) = 𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑎3 − 𝑋(1,2)) − 𝑃3;  𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑎2  
𝑈(2) {
𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑎2 − 𝑋(1,2)) − 𝑃2 𝑖𝑓 𝑎2 > 𝑋𝑖 ;  𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑎2
𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑋(2,3) − 𝑎2) − 𝑃2 𝑖𝑓 𝑎2 < 𝑋𝑖 ;  𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑎2
 
  
𝑋𝑖 is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎconsumer located along the [0,1] line; 
Now to derive 𝑋(1,2) and 𝑋(2,3) which are the indifferent consumers of this model: 
𝑋(1,2) ↔ 𝑈(1) = 𝑈(2) ↔ 
↔ 𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑋(1,2) − 𝑎1) − 𝑃1 = 𝑅 − 𝑡(𝑎2 − 𝑋(1,2)) − 𝑃2  ↔ 








𝑋(2,3) ↔ 𝑈(2) = 𝑈(3) ↔ 







   
From these utility functions and indifferent consumers, we can derive all demands: 




















𝐷3 =  1 − 𝑋(2,3) ↔ 
𝑎 1    
  











2 − 𝑎2 − 𝑎3
2
 










2 − 𝑎2 − 𝑎3
2
 
With, 𝑎1 = 0, 𝑎2 =
1
2













When prices are equal and we consider the location to be a strategic variable, the first 
impression would be that demands would also be equal, but this is not the case. Demands are 
not equal along seaports; this is because the centre seaport is better positioned than the seaports 
on the extremes of the [0; 1]line. As the seaports located on the extremes start moving to the 
centre, 𝐷2 starts to go down as the other demands 𝐷1and 𝐷3 start going up, this is due to the 
fact that seaports that once were on the extremes dislocated to a closer location of the centre 
and the influential zone of the centre seaports becomes smaller and smaller. The following 

















𝐷3 =  0.375 
As the extreme seaports dislocated to the quartiles, 𝐷2 was reduced by half and 𝐷1and 𝐷2 
increased by the same relative proportion. Lastly let us confirm that demands are concave and 





















From the above result, it can be seen that the derivative of the demand with respect to prices 
of the respective seaport is negative, so we conclude that seaport demands are concave with 
respect to prices and thus, seaports have incentives to decrease prices to capture higher 
demands. 
Profit expression functions:  
𝜋1 = (𝑃1 − 𝑐1). 𝐷1 ↔ 














𝜋2 = (𝑃2 − 𝑐2). 𝐷2 ↔ 




















𝜋3 = (𝑃3 − 𝑐3). 𝐷3 ↔ 




2 − 𝑎2 − 𝑎3
2








Let us take the first order conditions: 














































































2− 𝑎2 − 𝑎3
2




























Now for the optimal pricing 𝑃𝑖
∗seaports will act as they knew what their price functions were 




























𝑡(2 − 𝑎2 − 𝑎3)
2
↔ {
































(𝑎2 + 2𝑎3 − 𝑎1)
− − − − − − − − − − − − − −
↔
↔ {









(𝑎2 + 2𝑎3 − 𝑎1)
− − − − − − − − − − − − − −
↔
↔ {
− − − − − − − − − − − − − −















(2 − 𝑎2 − 𝑎3)
↔ 
↔ {
− − − − − − − − − − − − − −










(14 − 6𝑎2 − 5𝑎3 − 𝑎1)
↔ 
↔ {
− − − − − − − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − − − − − − −
𝑃3
∗ =





(14 − 6𝑎2 − 5𝑎3 − 𝑎1)
↔ 
↔ {
− − − − − − − − − − − − − −
𝑃2
∗ =











(𝑎2 + 2𝑎3 − 𝑎1)
− − − − − − − − − − − − − −
↔ 
↔ {
− − − − − − − − − − − − − −
𝑃2
∗ =





(28 + 14𝑎1 − 14𝑎3)

















− − − − − − − − − − − − − −












(28 + 70𝑎1 + 84𝑎2 + 14𝑎3)
− − − − − − − − − − − − − −














(2 + 5𝑎1 + 6𝑎2 + 𝑎3)
𝑃2
∗ =





(4 + 2𝑎3 − 2𝑎1)
𝑃3
∗ =





(14 − 6𝑎2 − 5𝑎3 − 𝑎1)
 
 



















(4 + 2𝑎3 − 2𝑎1) 
2𝑡
− [












∗ =  





























(14− 6𝑎2− 5𝑎3 − 𝑎1)
2𝑡
− [







































(8 + 4𝑎3 − 4𝑎1) 


















(4 + 2𝑎3 −2𝑎1)
2𝑡
− [





(14− 6𝑎2 − 5𝑎3 − 𝑎1)
2𝑡
] +










(14 − 5𝑎3 − 6𝑎2 − 𝑎1) 
 




and 𝑎3 = 1, replacing in the demand functions, we get: 𝐷1
∗ = 0.25; 𝐷2
∗ = 0.5 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷3







Optimal profit expression for seaport 1 





(2 + 5𝑎1 + 6𝑎2 + 𝑎3)
2 
 
With this condition, I can compare the optimal profit expression with the one from Appendix 
1. 
Comparing optimal profit expression for two and three competitors 
From appendix 1,  
𝜋1
∗ =





Replacing in both expressions by the same value for each variable; let’s assume 𝑡 = 1, 𝑎1 =
0.2, 𝑎2 = 0.75 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎3 = 0.5  
 
For the two-seaport model profit expression 
𝜋1
∗ =

































Notice that for the second expression I replaced 𝑎2 for the value assumed by 𝑎3, this 
was because I introduced 𝑎3with a value that is between 𝑎1and 𝑎2, so in the order meet the 
right dynamics of the optimal profit expression, the adjustment had to be made, although it 
does not affect the veracity of the argument. If for instance 𝑎3was to take a value higher than 
0.75, the argument would still be true. So, the conclusion is that as the number of competitors 
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